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Seeing and being seen are, from the beginning, constant themes in 
Kierkegaard s authorship. Not the least significant aspect of the many vari­
ations he plays upon them is that not only are they constant, they also 
emerge in quite varied contexts. At the one extreme, they are central to his 
characterization of what I have called the spectacular city, whose social 
ambitions are summed up in the injunction to see and be seen — where see­
ing, as Heiberg had already commented, usually meant little more than 
gaping. This is the city that is mirrored in outings to the Deer Park, Tivoli 
and, in a darker tone, aesthetes and seducers. Whether in its popular or in 
its sophisticated forms, however, I suggest that Kierkegaard s last word on it 
is that it is the city of the evil one, whose own essence is distilled into his 
“glittering look” (SV3 14,1561). At the other extreme, in the inward life of 
faith, it is true that the themes of seeing and being seen might appear to be 
buried beneath the protective mantle of hidden inwardness, or the divine 
forgetfulness in which even the thought of sin is obliterated. Yet, as I hope 
to illustrate, this divine forgetfulness can itself be portrayed as a kind of see­
ing, namely, a kind of seeing that overlooks sin because its eye is fixed upon 
the person of the penitent sinner, a kind of seeing that is the look of love. 
Importantly, this is not a figure that only emerges late in Kierkegaard s 
authorship, it is there from the beginning (at least from 1843), and that 
therefore constitutes an accompanying counterpoint to the dazzling sights 
and glittering eyes of the spectacular city.
I shall begin with a few remarks about the optics of the spectacular city 
and, in particular, of the Seducer. I shall then proceed to say something 
about Kierkegaard’s understanding of conscience, which hinges on the idea 
of an internalized “being seen”, akin to what Don Cupitt has called the 
“eyes of God” motif in religious thought. Lastly, I shall come to main point
of my paper, namely the look of love with which Christ encounters “the 
woman who was a sinner” of Luke Chapter 7. This, I believe, serves 
Kierkegaard as one of the pivotal moments of scripture, an icon, if one 
wills, of how a fulfilled relation to God in Christ might appear, and, as such, 
a definitive icon of the Christ himself. That this woman has been a less 
prominent “figure of faith” in the secondary literature than, say, Abraham 
or the blood-witness is not so much a fault of the texts themselves, but 
reflects the distortions of the history of reception. That is not to say the 
Abraham and the blood-witness are negligible figures, but simply that if 
they are seen without the light cast by the sinful woman, then decisive ele­
ments of the Christ-relationship remain unclarified. As for Christ himself, 
I suggest that the image of Christ seen here similarly supplements the pic­
ture offered, on the one hand, by the virtually incognito Christ of, say, 
Philosophical Fragments, or the “man of sorrows”, cross-carrying and dying 
for us who becomes so prominent in the later works. Again, I would use 
the word “pivotal”, because although the message of the look of love with 
which Christ meets the sinful woman is said by Kierkegaard to be taken 
over or deepened by the knowledge of his sacrificial death, the encounter 
between them is paradigmatic for how that sacrificial death can be con­
strued as ‘saving’. Importantly for the coherence of Kierkegaard’s author­
ship this scenario of Christ and the sinful woman can also be read as a rep­
etition of the aesthetics of seduction -  in which, however, all is changed 
from our first encounter with seduction in the pages of Either/Or.
First, then, some remarks on the optics of the spectacular city as they 
find expression in The Seducer’s Diary.
The very first entry in the diary, April 4th, contains a series of remarks 
about seeing and being seen that leave us in no doubt that its author is, or 
regards himself as, a virtuoso in exploiting the shifting perspectives of life 
in the spectacular city. The diary opens as a young girl is stepping down 
from a carriage. Unseen, Johannes watches her. Unseen — but not because 
he is lurking in the shadows: on the contrary -  he is standing beneath a 
streetlight, which, he says, makes it quite impossible for her to see him, since 
‘... one is only ever invisible to the extent that one is seen, but one is only 
ever seen to the extent that one sees . . .’ (SV3 2,291).What this intention­
ally provocative formulation seems to mean is that a man standing inno­
cently in the gaslight will not attract attention in the same way as one 
glimpsed lurking in the shadows. It is the same principle that is invoked 
when in detective stories, the top secret documents are deliberately left on 
the hall table. They are not seen because no one pays much attention to
papers lying on a hall table. Yet there is also an equivocation in the use of 
see/ seen that goes further than this relatively commonplace observation. 
For, as the context makes clear, Johannes sees the girl, but she does not — 
yet -  see him. If we literally applied the formula that ‘one is only ever seen 
to the extent that one sees’, it would seem that the girl cannot be seen by 
Johannes, since she does not see him. But this is precisely to miss the fun­
damental one-sidedness the Seducers visual practice: she is seen when and 
as he wants to see her, but she can only see him when and as he wants to 
be seen, which means when and as he lets her see him by letting her see 
him seeing her.This occurs moments later when, as she turns into a sale, he 
steps out of the light and lets his ‘side-glance’ fall upon her -  and ‘one does­
n’t forget my side-glance so easily’ (SV3 2,293). It would be easy, of course, 
to wax ironical over the vanity of Kierkegaard’s pretensions at this point, if 
it were not for the fact that this side-glance has indeed become an unfor­
gettable topos of modern European literature! But back to the streets of 
Copenhagen and to the moment, ‘the second of decision’, in which the 
Seducer’s side-glance falls upon the seventeen year old girl.‘You blush; your 
bosom too full to find relief in breath; your look is angry, proudly con­
temptuous; there is a prayer, a tear, in your eyes; both are equally beautiful 
and I am equally entitled to both, for I can as well be the one as the other’ 
(SV3 2, 292). Here, then, we see, literally see, the reality of the power-play 
between the Seducer and those he allows to see him. Forget seduction, this 
side-glance is already a violent breaching of the integrity of its victim, taken 
hostage by a gaze in which she is merely seen and cannot see, cannot return 
to her proper subjectivity, except in the measure that his eye allows. But 
Johannes is not finished. The affair of the side-glance was, after all, the affair 
of a second. Now — ‘mischievously’, as he admits -  he follows her in to the 
sale and, as she pores over the goods, he watches her in a mirror, seeing but 
unseen.‘Unhappy mirror,’ he muses,‘which can indeed take her image but 
not her, unhappy mirror, which cannot keep her image in secrecy, hiding it 
from the whole world, but, on the contrary, can only betray it to others as 
it does now to me’ (SV3 2, 292). How many people resemble the mirror, 
he thinks, reflecting only what is given in the passing moment of experi­
ence, lacking the capacity to create a ‘recollected image in the very moment 
of presence’ (SV3 2,292). This, then, is the epitome of what his own ‘look’ 
can achieve: the creation of an image that is defining for a given situation, 
‘defining’ not only for him and his ‘recollection’, but also for the other 
whose being is also caught in this image.
O f course, there is a whole other angle on this, from which the Seduc­
er might himself be seen as a self-condemned ‘unhappy lover of recollec­
tion’ and as the alter ego of the melancholy solipsist of the Diapsalmata, 
whose sorrow is the castle to which he returns after each foray into reality 
to brood upon the images he has brought back, weaving them into the tap­
estries that line his inner walls and that give him a grey substitute for the 
life he doesn’t live. For our present purposes, however, we take him at his 
word, and see him as and to the extent that he wishes us to see him.
We shall return to the Seducer, but now I would like to proceed to the 
question of conscience. If the Seducer’s universe is defined by his own sub­
jective gaze, the existence of one in whom conscience has awoken is an 
existence that learns to see itself in the eyes of another. This finds striking 
exemplification in what some readers find one of Kierkegaard’s weirder 
ideas. In Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits and again, at greater length, 
in Works of Love, Kierkegaard recommends the practice of recollecting the 
dead, not, as in some forms of Christian spirituality, for the benefit of the 
departed soul itself, but for the moral and religious improvement of the one 
doing the remembering. How would it be, he reflects, ‘if one of those dis­
tinguished ones, whose memory is preserved by the crowd, in the manner 
of the crowd, with noisy festivities and shouting, if — and this is something 
far more serious -  if he came to you and visited you so that you would then 
have to dare defend your actions in the face of his testing gaze’ (SV3 11, 
126). Such a thought-experiment reverses the perspective of would-be 
Seducers, since I, the subject, am no longer the originator of the gaze that 
defines my world: instead I am the one scrutinized. In this reversal I begin 
to see myself with the eyes of another. In Works of Love the act of remem­
bering the departed is made into a kind of spiritual exercise through which 
I learn to practice disinterestedness, freedom and faithfulness, measuring 
myself not only against my ability to continue loving in the absence of the 
loved object (this would still be a subject-centred ascesis), but also against 
the resistance of the departed to subjective manipulation. A dead person, 
Kierkegaard admits,‘is not a real object, he is only the occasion which con­
stantly reveals what dwells in [the hearts of] the living person who relates 
to him ... ’ (SV3 12, 331). And,
. ..  be above all attentive to what you say to the departed.You can maybe 
say ‘I w ill never forget you ’ calmly enough to a living person and, w hen  
once a few  years have passed, you w ill hopefully both have blithely forgot­
ten everything ... [But] W hen  you say “I w ill never forget you ” to one o f  
the departed, it is as i f  he answered:‘G ood, and be assured that I shall never
forget that you have said it’. And even i f  all those living were to assure you  
that he had forgotten it, you w ould not hear it from the dead m an’s ow n  
lips. N o , he goes his way, but he is not altered’ (SV 3  12, 339).
One who remembers the departed in this way, is no longer the centre of 
his own universe, he is one accused, we could say, held to account, watched 
in every move he makes by another.
Something analogous occurs when I listen in an appropriate manner to 
a religious address or read an upbuilding discourse, as Upbuilding Discourses 
in Various Spirits also famously illustrates.The truly attentive listener or read­
er, we are told, is to conceive of himself not as the spectator of somebody 
else s spiritual trial, but as being himself‘on stage’, the object of another’s 
critical gaze. Only this other is no longer merely another human (as the 
departed continue to be, even in their transfigured or eternal state), it is 
God himself. Under this gaze, as under that of one of the ‘transfigured 
ones’, the inner being of a person is revealed, and we are enabled and 
required to see ourselves as we truly are:‘God’s presence is decisive, and it 
alters everything. As soon as God is present, every human being has the task, 
before God, to attend to himself,’ (SV3 11,115). But this is a self-attention 
very different from that of the narcissistic self-absorption of the extreme 
aesthete, precisely because it is a self-attention refracted through the gaze 
of another.
The reorientation of the gaze brought about by remembering the dead 
and appropriately attending to the religious discourse can also be named 
the awakening of conscience. For, as Kierkegaard writes in the Conclusion 
to Works of Love, ‘In conscience it is God who looks at a person, so that a 
person will look to him in all things’ (SV3 12,359).The deliberateness with 
which Kierkegaard has recourse to the metaphorics of vision at this point 
is signalled by the manner in which he introduces this definition of con­
science: ‘... the clever educator chooses to educate by means of the eyes. 
He takes each individual child’s eyes away, that is, he forces the child to look 
to him in everything ... The child who is being educated can easily imag­
ine that his relation to his chums and the little world that they form is real­
ity, against which the eye of the teacher teaches him that all this is being 
used for the child’s education’ (SV3 12, 359). The child, in other words, 
finds itself like the young girl caught by the eye of the Seducer, its own 
view of the world is suspended and it is made to see with another’s eyes and 
thus to see that there is more to the world than, left to itself, it could ever 
possibly see. It is, then, in this way that God educates by his gaze, breaking
open the illusions of a would-be self-sufficient finitude, an autonomic 
striving that believes itself capable of creating its own world, defining its 
own values, controlling its relations to others. For those who know that the 
eyes of God are always watching, there is always a larger perspective, a wider 
horizon than that within which they currently interpret and act upon the 
world. Every reflection, every interpretation, every action is therefore nec­
essarily and in principle revisable in the sense that it’s meaning is potentially 
different from what we ourselves have seen in it. Every action must be ven­
tured in fear and trembling and with the consideration that we may be mis­
taken. This, we might say, is a view of conscience in which God is prima­
rily the accuser. Those who know themselves to be watched by God in this 
way are those who know themselves to stand under accusation, who can­
not answer for their own righteousness.
Here, then, is the metaphorical underpinning of the systematic defini­
tion of sin in The Sickness unto Death:1 Sin is: before God, or having the idea 
of God despairingly not being willing to be oneself, or despairingly will­
ing to be oneself,’ in which, as is immediately added, ‘That on which the 
emphasis falls is: before God . ..’ (SV3 15,131).Beneath the abstract formu­
lation ‘before God’, we are, I think, to read the depiction of human beings 
as being what and as they are by virtue of the way in which they are seen 
by God in a way that is now familiar with us, or, if a more Kantian inter­
pretation of Kierkegaard is allowable, by virtue of the way in which they 
imagine themselves as open to the all-exposing gaze of God.
As we know, the ascending dialectic of The Sickness unto Death does not 
come to a halt with the category ‘before God’.There is a yet further step, 
and that is the category ‘before Christ’. Here too, I suggest, we are entitled 
to read into this expression the idea of being regarded by the Christ we find 
ourselves or imagine ourselves as being ‘before’. Here too there is talk of a 
further ‘potentiation’ of sin, namely that to the condition of existing in 
despair one now further despairs by being offended at Christ. However, this 
offence is essentially the reflex, ‘the acoustic illusion’ as Kierkegaard else­
where puts it, of what is offered in Christ, namely the forgiveness of sins. If 
existing ‘before Christ’ in the mode of despair is thus ‘offence’, then truly 
to exist before Christ, existing before Christ with an understanding of what 
that meant and accepting what it meant, would be to exist with the knowl­
edge of the forgiveness of sins.
If linking the idea of conscience with the idea of existing before God 
leads us to think of ourselves as under accusation, the idea of existing before 
Christ, though structurally analogous to existence ‘before God’, thus
bespeaks deliverance from accusation, forgiveness, and the possibility of self 
acceptance.This is the true content of faith and, in the language of The Sick­
ness unto Death, it is also what it means to exist as the selves we are when 
grounded transparently in the power that posits us.That power is not mere­
ly the power of donating being, but the power of bestowing forgiveness and 
so the power that enables self-acceptance.What we most truly ‘are’, then, is 
persons embraced by the forgiveness offered in Christ. The possibility of 
this forgiveness, moreover, meets us primarily in the form of self-con­
sciousness in which we understand ourselves as ‘before’, that is, being 
beheld by Christ, held and transformed in his ‘look of love’.2
I suggest that it is the figure of‘the sinful woman’ that gives us the clear­
est and certainly the most recurrent image of what it might mean to find 
ourselves held and transformed by this look. Importantly, she appears 
already in the three upbuilding discourses of 1843 (published on the same 
day as Fear and Trembling and Repetition), but she is also prominent in the 
three Friday communion discourses of September 1849 ( 'The High Priest’ 
— ‘The Tax-Collector’ — 'The Woman who was a Sinner’), said by Kierkegaard to 
be ‘related to the last pseudonym Anti-Climacus’ or to be ‘parallel to Anti- 
Climacus’,3 in the single Upbuilding Discourse of December 1850 and the 
Two Discourses at the Friday Communion, which though published in August 
1851 is assigned by Kierkegaard to the late summer of 1849. The sinful 
woman thus provides a point of thematic continuity between the early 
upbuilding discourses, regarded by most commentators as reflecting a very 
low stage in Kierkegaardian religiousness, and The Sickness unto Death, 
regarded by most commentators as so elevated that Kierkegaard did not 
dare put his name to it. But the argument is not only about continuity, it is 
also about coherence. I propose that this sinful woman offers a vantage- 
point from which to see the essential unity of Kierkegaard’s religious 
thought, the upbuilding and the radically Christian works, and providing a 
vital perspective on how the religious works in general ‘answer’ to the chal­
lenge of the aesthetic.
There are two biblical texts that play an especially important role in 
Kierkegaard’s use of the sinful woman. The first, and most obvious, is Luke 
7. 37ff., where we encounter the story of the sinful woman who bursts in 
to a dinner party being held for Jesus by Simon the Pharisee, and falls at 
Jesus’ feet, weeping over them, anointing them with oil and washing them 
with her hair before hearing him say (after a polemical exchange with his 
host),‘Your sins are forgiven’ and ‘Your faith has saved you; go in peace’ (Lk 
7.48,50).The other is 1 Peter 4.7 ‘Love shall cover a multitude of sins’.The
link is provided by the exchange between Jesus and Simon in Luke 7, 
where Jesus tells the mini-parable of the two men indebted to a money­
lender, one owing five hundred silver pieces, the other fifty. As neither of 
them can pay, the moneylender cancels the debt. Jesus compels his host to 
concede that the one who is forgiven most, will love most. He then enu­
merates the signs by which the woman has shown her love, which, he says, 
‘proves that her many sins have been forgiven’ (Lk 7. 47).
It is the text of 1 Peter that is taken for the first two of the Three Upbuild­
ing Discourses of 1843. In the first of these it is relevant to the theme of see­
ing, being seen and the look of love that Kierkegaard is provoked by the 
idea of concealment implied in the text to ask whether it is an imperfec­
tion in love not to see the multitude of sins that are often really out there 
to be seen. He comments ‘What it comes down to is not only what one 
sees, but what one sees comes down to how one sees. For looking (Betragt- 
ning) in general is not just receptive, a matter of discovering, but is also pro­
ductive, and insofar as it is this, then it is indeed decisive how the one who 
looks himself is’ (SV3 4, 61). O f course, he concedes, insofar as the object 
in question belongs to the objective world, the subjective state of the 
observer is not so important. However, when ‘the object being looked at 
belongs to the world of spirit, it is so much the more important how [the 
one looking] is in his innermost being. For everything in the spiritual 
world can only be acquired freely, but what is acquired freely is also some­
thing produced’ (SV3 4, 61). An evil eye may therefore discover much that 
the look of love overlooks, but, conversely, an evil eye will not see God.
These elucidations can readily be applied to the sinful woman. In the 
second of the three discourses she makes her first appearance in the author­
ship. Kierkegaard rapidly sketches the scene as depicted in Luke. He 
reminds us that ‘A woman could not be an invited guest, this one least of 
all, for the Pharisees knew that she was a sinner. If nothing else had been 
able to frighten her and hold her back, the proud contempt of the Phar­
isees, their silent ill-will, their holy indignation could well have scared her 
off’ (SV3 4, 74-5).The woman is under accusation, but her love gives her 
the courage to force her way past her accusers to the feet of the Saviour, 
where, as Kierkegaard puts it, she is given ‘the grace, as it were, to weep her­
self out of herself and weep herself into love’s repose’ (SV3 4, 75). Howev­
er, as Kierkegaard goes on to ask, if love can thus overcome the guilt of one 
under accusation, does it follow that it will also overcome the accusation 
itself. Surely justice has its rights and will not be bribed by love. But love 
also has its right, ‘for he who judges, has his demands, but he, who has his
demands, he is seeking, and he “who hides the multitude of sins, is seeking 
love” (Proverbs 17.9); but he, who finds love, he hides the multitude of sins; 
for he who finds what he was seeking, he indeed hides what he was not 
seeking’ (SV3 4, 76). And so Kierkegaard once more retells the story of 
Luke 7.This time the woman is shown bent over as she enters, bearing the 
weight of the multitude of her sins, the judgement of the Pharisees legible 
in their faces, so that all there was to see was a multitude of sins. Then, con­
tinues Kierkegaard4love discovered what the world was hiding — the love in 
her; and as this had not fully triumphed in her, the Saviour’s love came to 
her aid ... and he made the love in her powerful enough to cover the mul­
titude of sins, the love, that is, that was already there, for “her many sins were 
forgiven, because she loved much” ’ (SV3 4, 76-7).
When, six years later, Kierkegaard returns to this scenario in the three 
Friday Communion discourses, it is with this element of the story, that ‘she 
loved much’, that he begins, beginning already in the opening prayer whose 
introductory petition asks Christ to inflame the love in us that we might 
love Him much. So too when Kierkegaard comes to the exposition, that 
‘she loved much’ is once more the starting-point. His retelling of the story 
is more complex, more filled out with descriptive chiaroscuro than in the 
earlier discourse. The shame and indignity of the woman’s status and the 
judgemental posture of the Pharisees is elaborated on and intensified. She 
has become the epitome of sin, venturing into the very presence of ‘the 
Holy’. Even the festivity of the occasion is used to heighten the tension, as 
Kierkegaard contrasts the privacy of the Church’s confessional with the 
public exposure of letting her sin be seen in the midst of such a festive gath­
ering. That she should have to do this is not merely hard, it is ‘cruel’ (SV3 
14,195). Nevertheless, she does it and, at the feet of the Lord she enacts the 
impossibility of her situation, doing nothing, because she is nothing, and in 
thus becoming nothing, in entire self-forgetfulness, she becomes a ‘sign’, ‘an 
image’. Even Christ himself seems to regard her as nothing, speaking about 
her but not to her, as he tells Simon that her sins are forgiven, ‘And it is 
almost as if the Saviour himself, for a moment, regarded her and the situa­
tion thus, as if she was not an actual person but an image ... it is almost as 
if he turned her into an image, a parable — and yet that very thing was hap­
pening in the same moment right there’ (SV3 14,197). Her self-forgetful­
ness and Christ’s response transform her into ‘an image ... a recollection’ 
(SV3 14,198) o r‘an eternal image’ (SV3 14,198). And what is she an‘eter­
nal image’, an icon, of? She is an eternal image both of the forgiveness of 
sins and of the ‘much love’ that, as Kierkegaard writes here, are one and the
same. This, more precisely, suggests to Kierkegaard that whilst it is true that 
all our sins are forgiven ‘in Christ’ the truth of that forgiveness must be 
made true by each individual, and each individual can do that only by tak­
ing to heart the image of this woman and ‘loving much’: .. by her great 
love she made herself -  if I dare put it like this -  necessary to the Saviour, 
for that there is forgiveness of sins, which he earned, is made true by her, 
who loved much’ (SV3 14,199). Kierkegaard’s ‘if I dare put it like this’ indi­
cates that he is conscious of being close to or beyond the margin of what 
is permissible within the framework of Protestant dogmatics, but that he is 
prepared to take such risks on her behalf also underlines the importance 
that the sinful woman has for him. In the single Upbuilding Discourse of 
December 1850, also devoted to her, Kierkegaard once more touches on 
the delicate question as to whether her love is somehow to be regarded as 
meriting forgiveness, only, in typically Kierkegaardian style, he does so 
obliquely. Referring back to Jesus’ word that ‘her many sins are forgiven 
because she loved much’, Kierkegaard comments that he presumes that she 
simply didn’t hear this word, or misheard it, believing him to have said that 
it was because he loved much that her many sins were forgiven, so that it 
was his own infinite love he was talking about (SV3 17, 20). In this way, 
Kierkegaard implies, the logic of love, seen from the inside, simply does not 
allow for the kind of talk about merit that has bothered dogmaticians.The 
question o f‘earning’ forgiveness can only arise for those who are outside 
the orbit of love, for love regards itself as nothing, the other as everything, 
and it could never arise in the heart of love to talk of merit on its own part. 
Similarly, in the first of the discourses of summer 1851, where the text is 
again taken from Luke 7 (v. 47 ‘To whom little is forgiven loves little’), 
although the woman is not directly mentioned, Kierkegaard expressly 
brushes aside the objection that he is making it sound as if love somehow 
earns forgiveness.
Pay attention now  and see how  w e are, though, not entering into the 
unhappy realm o f  merit, but how  everything remains w ithin love. W hen  
you love much, m uch is forgiven you — and w hen  m uch is forgiven you, 
you love much. See here the blessed retroaction o f  salvation in love! First, 
you love much, and m uch is forgiven you -  oh, look  and see how  love then  
increases; that so m uch has been forgiven you, this loves forth love once 
more, and you love m uch because m uch has been forgiven you!’ (SV 3  17,
37)
In the ‘eternal image’ of the sinful woman weeping at the feet of the Lord, 
then, we have what is for Kierkegaard the perfect expression of such a vir­
tuous circle of love begetting love in a movement that can also be described 
from the human side as coming to accept the forgiveness of sins.
This circularity might also be figured as a mirroring, namely, the mir­
roring of her needy love in Christ’s giving love, and the mirroring of his 
love in hers. As such it also recalls several of the climactic moments of ear­
lier upbuilding discourses, where the self that is rightly placed in relation to 
God is said by Kierkegaard to be transparent to or to reflect the light of the 
divine presence in the same way that a completely still sea reflects the light 
of the sky. In the last of the Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses this state is iden­
tified with that of becoming as nothing, a state, we might say, of complete 
emptiness. In the first part of Upbuilding Discourses the same imagery recurs 
to describe the soul that has truly learned to will one thing and to gather 
itself into the serenity of the single desire. So too the woman of the 1850 
discourse is described, firstly, as someone who was entirely taken up with 
one thought:‘everything else had become indifferent: everything temporal, 
earthly, worldly, honour, dignity, good times, the future, family, friends, the 
judgement of others, and she bore every care lightly, whatever it might be, 
almost as if it were nothing, because only one thing unconditionally con­
cerned her enough to care about it: her sin’ (SV3 17, 17), although, as 
Kierkegaard shortly afterwards comments, this is not quite right, because 
the one thing that really concerned her unconditionally was ‘to find for­
giveness’ (SV3 17,17). Added to this, she is also described as someone who 
realized that, in relation to this — her one all-consuming concern, her one 
great passion — that ‘in relation to finding forgiveness she was herself able 
to do nothing at all’ (SV3 17,18).‘She enters in. She fully understands that 
she is herself able to do nothing. Therefore she does not give herself over 
to passionate cries of self-accusation, as if this might bring her closer to 
being saved or make her more well-pleasing to God; she does not make an 
excessive fuss and, truly, no one could have accused her of that. No, she does 
nothing at all, she is silent — she weeps’ (SV3 17,19).
As one who both wills one thing and one who sinks down into her own 
nothingness, she is indeed the human counterpart of the sea that has 
become still and transparent and so able to mirror the sheer infinity of the 
divine love.
Before we leave these more narrowly theological topics and return to 
the question as to what such a scene might mean for the citizens of the 
nineteenth century spectacular city, I note that whereas in the three dis­
courses of 1849 the woman is spoken of in terms that make of her an 
almost unsurpassable icon of the forgiveness of sins, both the single dis­
course of 1850 and the second of the two discourses of 1851 add that there 
is one thing more to take into account, or, rather two very closely con­
nected things.The first is that, as Kierkegaard puts it in the single discourse,
‘we have a comfort that she didn't have', that is, the comfort derived from 
knowledge of the Saviour’s death. Both here and in the 1851 discourse this 
is further connected to the setting in which the discourses are being spo­
ken, the Communion service, and the presence of Christ’s body in the 
sacrament of the altar.
Both these points relate to the theme of hiddenness and concealment 
that runs through all of these discourses. This is also, according to 
Kierkegaard, a feature of the Friday Communion itself, as he emphasizes in 
the opening words of one of the communion addresses from Christian Dis­
courses, where he contrast the experience of going to Church on a Sunday, 
when one hails other passers-by as fellow Churchgoers, with that of going 
through the busy streets on a Friday morning — ‘In full view of all, yet hid­
den: [that is how] the individual went to Church today, hidden, or on the 
hidden path, for no one knew what path he trod, no passer-by thought you 
were going to God’s house ... you went hidden amongst the many like a 
stranger’ (SV3 13,255). In the midst of the spectacular city, then, the com­
municant treads a secret path; indeed, Kierkegaard says, it is not even as if 
he is going to Church, he is going to the altar, going to seek the forgive­
ness of sins. For the forgiveness of sins is, in itself, a secret work, secret from 
the world and its condemning gaze, secret from the devil and his ‘glittering 
eye, which looks as if it could penetrate earth and sea and the most hidden 
secret places of the heart’ (SV3 14,156). But the ones who know their need 
of God, who seek forgiveness, who love much, are ones who are hidden 
from themselves, lost in what Kierkegaard describes in the discourse on the 
Pharisee and the tax-collector as a ‘vertigo’ of the infinite, in which the eye 
can find nothing on which to fix (SV3 14,185fi). Even conscience is sus­
pended in such a vertiginous loss of vision, for there can be no more talk 
of a, so to speak, distanced self-relation in which I view myself‘as if’ with 
the eyes of another. In this perspective there really is nothing in the heart 
of the penitent sinner for the ‘glittering eye’ of the devil to see! All that is 
to be seen here is what Christ gives to be seen by himself seeing the scene 
in such a way as to make it into an ‘eternal image’.
But it would seem that there is a yet stronger expression of this secret 
work of forgiveness than that offered by the woman who was a sinner. For
the comfort which we have that she did not have, is knowledge of his sav­
ing death for the forgiveness of sins. In other words, what we see in the icon 
of the woman is an immediate expression of Christ's ‘love for sinners free’; 
in his word to the woman, as to others, Jesus pledged his life, in love: but, 
as Kierkegaard puts it, ‘when is it easiest to believe, and when is the com­
fort greatest? Is it when the beloved says, I will do it -  or when he has done 
it?’ (SV3 17,22). In this case, of course,‘doing it’ meant, precisely, Jesus giv­
ing his life on the cross. This death, re-presented at the altar, is therefore 
more than a word of forgiveness, it is also a word of atonement.
O ne hears talk about works o f  love, and there are many such that can be 
named. But w hen  love s work or the work o f  love is spoken of, then there 
is, yes, then there is but one work, and astonishingly enough, you know  
im mediately what is being talked about, it is about him, about Jesus Christ, 
about his atoning death w hich  covers a multitude o f  sins. This is what is 
proclaimed from the altar, for i f  it is his life that is proclaimed from the pul­
pit, it is his death that is proclaimed at the altar (SV3  17, 46).
If the look of love that meets the sinful woman in answer to the love that, 
from her side, expresses itself in her downcast eyes, the death of Christ 
‘quite literally’, Kierkegaard says (SV3 17, 45), covers the multitude of sins 
with his ‘holy body’ (SV3 17, 45), hiding them both from the judging gaze 
of righteousness and from that of anxious repentance.
Yet if Kierkegaard in this way insists that, finally, the sacramental procla­
mation of Christ crucified must take precedence over the icon of the sin­
ful woman who loved much, the way in which he places these two images 
alongside one another raises a further interesting question which has 
important implications for our view of Kierkegaard’s theology, understand­
ing that term in the narrow sense of the formal academic discourse of 
Christian theology characteristic of Protestant Europe in Kierkegaard’s 
time.
It is clear from several of the Friday Communion discourses that 
Kierkegaard has no problems in speaking the language of mainstream West­
ern atonement theory, that Jesus’s death on the cross was as a sacrifice for 
sin, ‘making satisfaction’, and that he died for me, in my place, doing what 
I could not do to secure forgiveness for my sins. By setting his most dog­
matically mainstream reflections on Christ’s death in such proximity to the 
woman who was a sinner, however, Kierkegaard implicitly offers a subtly 
different take from that of conventional atonement theory, a take which
seems to place him within the paradigm of Schleiermacher’s revisionary 
approach. For where the classic formulations of atonement theory make 
clear that what must be satisfied is Gods righteous condemnation of sin, 
and what must be suffered is the punishment due on account of that sin, 
Kierkegaard allows us to see the movement culminating in Christ’s death 
as an extension of the exchange of love seen in the icon of the sinful 
woman. This death is, so to speak, a seeing-through or enactment of the 
offer of love made in his life, not the execution of a contract that is, as in 
much atonement theory, virtually independent of his lived ministry. The 
death, in other words, is not being understood by Kierkegaard as something 
other than the life but as fulfilling the promise made in and by a life of a 
love. Nor does it seem that the question as to how God’s righteousness is to 
be placated is of great significance for Kierkegaard, as it is in classic atone­
ment theory. If there is a righteous indignation that has to be propitiated 
by Christ’s death, a wrath that must be covered, it is precisely the (unright­
eous indignation of human justice. Christ, always for Kierkegaard the God- 
Man, does not express anything other than what is the essential will of God 
himself. The look of love with which Christ transforms our penitent love 
for him into an eternal image of forgiveness, is God’s own look of love.
There is one thing more to add. In the scenario of the sinful women at 
the feet of Christ, in the way in which he turns her into an image, albeit an 
eternal image, there is something disturbingly reminiscent of the Seducer. 
Wasn’t it the Seducer’s forte to turn young women — usually, of course, 
innocent young women and not well-experienced sinful women — into 
‘images’, so that they have no alternative but to ‘be’ the way he sees them? 
Is Christ, then, also a kind of Seducer, turning real life sinful women into 
‘recollected images’, Seducer-like trapping them in the role of being-for- 
another?
How Kierkegaard might answer such a charge has already been implic­
itly suggested, however. Recall Johannes’ description of the girl’s reaction 
to his ‘side-glance’:‘You blush; your bosom too full to find relief in breath; 
your look is angry, proudly contemptuous; there is a prayer, a tear, in your 
eyes; both are equally beautiful and I am equally entitled to both, for I can 
as well be the one as the other’ (SV3 2, 292).This is indeed a portrayal of 
someone who has been violated, whose personal space has been broken 
into and commandeered by an alien presence. It is of the essence of the 
scene that Johannes has taken her by surprise, forced himself upon her, even 
if only in the form of the famed ‘side-glance’. But in every one of 
Kierkegaard’s descriptions of the sinful woman, it is clear that it is she who
takes the initiative: it is her bursting-in, her love that sets the scene in 
motion, that calls forth his look of love; her love that almost,‘if I dare put 
it like this’, is as necessary to him as his forgiveness is to her. Love calls forth 
love. If Johannes’ side-glance epitomizes the ‘glittering eye’ of the violent 
mutual exploitation that is subliminally to be glimpsed in the spectacular 
masquerade of the human city, the virtuous cycle of love, imaged in the 
‘parable’ of Luke 7, relived and repeated in the secrecy of the sacrament, 
refuses the allure of a culture of seduction and victimhood and, in doing so, 
sets a limit to that culture’s ambition of self-totalization.
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